Maryland Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3

Article 3

Retalatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants and Law
Reform
James W. McElhaney

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
James W. McElhaney, Retalatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants and Law Reform, 29 Md. L. Rev. 193 (1969)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol29/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Maryland Law Review
VOLUME XXIX

SUMMER,

1969

NUMBER 3

@ Copyright Maryland Law Review, Inc., 1969

RETALATORY EVICTIONS: LANDLORDS, TENANTS
AND LAW REFORM
By JAMES W.

MCELHANEY*

To rule otherwise would be to "usurp the legislative prerogative," to "open the floodgates" to
judicial legislating. We cannot cavalierly toss aside
the traditionsof Locke and Montesquieu, of checks
and balances, of separation of powers, that are the
very heart and soul of our governmental system. 1
When judges and lawyers announce that
judges can never validly make law, they are not
engaged in fooling the 2public; they have successfully fooled themselves.
For the past several years, Baltimore slum tenants have sought
a means to legally withhold rent in order to induce landlords to repair
faulty premises.' This effort is a reflection of a nation-wide attempt

to make law more responsive to the needs of the poor in which land-

lord-tenant problems have received heavy emphasis.4 Culminating a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A.,
Duke University, 1960; LL.B., Duke University School of Law, 1962. The author is
indebted to his colleague, Assistant Professor Everett F. Goldberg, for his thoughtful
assistance. Prior to publication, the author assisted in the preparation of a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court in Sommers v. Goode, a case discussed in this article.
1. Weinberg v. Scheper, No. 24453-68 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Nov. 30, 1968)
in The Daily Record (Baltimore), Dec. 5, 1968, at 2, col. 4.
2. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 37 (1935).
3. It is common for landlords to blame tenants and tenants to blame landlords
for slum conditions. This article does not suggest that one or the other is generally
more culpable. Other factors besides individual fault combine to make slums. Neither
is it suggested that the slums are caused by the legal system, although some blame
must be put there. To the extent that the law might alleviate some of the problems
of slum housing, it has failed to do so, largely because of an inequality of the legal
position of landlords and tenants. The focal point of this inquiry concerns problems
involved in bringing tenants closer to a legal parity with landlords.
4. This vast increase in attention has occurred since the beginnings of the "war
on poverty." It has been manifested in the funding of neighborhood legal services by
the Office of Economic Opportunity, national conferences on landlord-tenant problems,
and a profusion of law review articles. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEGAL
RIGHTS Op TENANTS,

TENANT'S

RIGHTS: LEGAL TOOLS FOR BETTER HOUSING 21
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series of abortive "rent strikes," picketing, an imaginatively attempted
common law rent escrow, and repeated attempts to pass remedial legislation, the Maryland Legislature finally took action. In 1968, it passed
Senate Bill 130, limited to Baltimore, which was intended to permit
rent to be paid into court when landlords fail to keep their premises
in repair.' For the first year after this reform, the situation remained
much the same. Landlords retained an effective weapon to prevent
rent escrow: retaliatory eviction of those tenants who attempted to
exercise their new right. Then, in 1969, the legislature passed a bill
which was originally designed as a broad prohibition against retaliatory eviction.' This bill was so severely truncated by the legislative
process that it fails entirely to protect tenants who must rely on complaints to housing authorities and gives but dubious aid to those permitted to withhold rent.
T.

IT

COMMON LAW BACKGROUND

In order to put the problems in their proper setting, it is essential
to examine the common law landlord-tenant relationship: the rules
which governed Baltimore leases until the recent legislation and which
still obtain throughout the rest of Maryland as well as most of the
United States.7 While leases are contracts, they stand apart from the
rest of contract law." A buyer of a chattel may be protected by an
implied warranty of fitness,9 but ordinarily a tenant has no similar
implied warranty. Unless the landlord has expressly agreed to repair,
it is not a breach of the contract to fail to do so.'" A tenant must
continue paying rent on faulty premises or face eviction - summary
ejection for failure to pay rent, a procedure which in Baltimore takes
about ten days from failure to pay until the eviction is executed."
This summary eviction can be brought even though the landlord has
(1967) ; Cahn and Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J.
1317 (1964) ; Sax and Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869
(1967) ; Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo.
L.J. 519 (1966) ; Comment, Tenants Remedies in the District of Columbia: New
Hope for Reform, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 80 (1968).
The need to reform landlord-tenant law prompted the Office of Economic
Opportunity to give financial support to a research program of the American Bar
Foundation. This research resulted in the preparation of a model code for residential
landlord-tenant relations. J. Lzvi, P. HABLUTZEL, L. ROSENBERG, J. WHITE, MODEL
RESIDENTIAL

LANDLORD-TENANT

CODE

MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT

(Tent.

Draft,

1969)

[hereinafter

cited as

CODE].

5. Ch. 459, [1968] Md. Laws 832.
6. Ch. 223, [1969] Md. Laws 680.
7. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112 (1875)

; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF

PROPERTY §§ 3.1-3.104 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
8. See Rhynhart, Notes on the Law of Landlord and Tenant, 20 MD. L. Rtv.
1 (1960).
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
the older UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15(1).

This principle was recognized under

10. See Clarke & Stevens v. Gerke, 104 Md. 504, 65 A. 326 (1906). At common
law the landlord was only held to give a covenant of quiet enjoyment. The name is
misleading, however, for this covenant merely protected the tenant against interference
with his occupancy by one claiming a superior legal right to the premises. Sigmund v.
Howard Bank, 29 Md. 324 (1868) ; W.E. Stephans Mfg. Co. v. Buntin, 27 Tenn. App.
411, 181 S.W.2d 634, 636 (1944).
11. CHARTER & P.L.L. OF BALTIMORE CITY (1949). §§ 456-60.
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violated an express covenant to keep the premises in repair." Even
if the tenant has a remedy against the landlord, he may be forced
to assert it in a separate action."3 Thus it is said that the tenant has
an independent covenant to pay rent.' 4 These two "doctrines," the
lack of implied warranties and the independent covenant to pay rent,
shaped the entire landlord-tenant relationship." They have little to
commend themselves today in an urban setting except that they have
always been the law.'"
These rules mean that a tenant is left without any direct remedy
against his landlord for failure to repair unless the landlord has
violated an express covenant in the lease. While wealthy tenants often
find that their leases are contracts of adhesion, sometimes making
severe inroads on their common law rights,'1 7 even the illusory protection of a written lease is denied most slum dwellers. The majority
of poor tenants in Baltimore, as elsewhere, live under oral agreements
where the rent is paid from week to week.'"
Building codes provide little help. In most jurisdictions tenants
may lodge complaints with an administrative agency' 9 and if, upon
investigation by the agency, defects are found which violate the code,
the landlord is ordered to make repairs. Failure to repair may result
in criminal action.2 0 Tenants complain that the process is slow and
12. See H. TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANr § 182, at 1237 n.1243 (1910). This
proposition is recognized in Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403, 407, 117 A. 882, 884 (1922).
13. In Baltimore, eviction actions are brought in the people's court. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 53, § 1 (1957). By local practice, eviction actions are heard in a division
called "Rent Court," where tenants are not permitted to assert claims against the landlord even though the people's court's limited jurisdiction may encompass the action.
Thus, as a practical matter, a separate action must be brought. In some jurisdictions
the tenant has a right of set-off. Tee note 65 infra and accompanying text. In Biggs
v. McCurley, 76 Md. 409, 415, 25 A. 466, 468 (1892), the court said in dicta, apparently
referring to cases where the landlord has breached an express agreement to repair:
If the repairs are of a trifling character, requiring but a small outlay of money,
it has been said in some cases, that the lessee himself ought to make such repairs,
and claim an allowance for the money expended by him out of the rent.
14. The Maryland Court of Appeals has stated:
[W]ith the usual covenant on the part of a landlord to keep the leased premises
in repair, the covenant would, under the weight of authority, be considered as
entirely independent of the covenant to pay rent, and a failure to repair would be
no defence to any action founded upon non-payment of rent ...
Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403, 407, 117 A. 882, 884 (1922).
15. In a sense it would be more accurate to say that the landlord-tenant relationship shaped the doctrine, for that is the operation of the judicial process. If landlords
and tenants were to start fresh with the courts today, few would argue that our
present rules would result. Thus, the rules definitely shape the present relationship.
For a more complete discussion of the Maryland cases, see Rhynhart, supra note 8,
at 26-7.
16. See Schoshinski, supra note 4, at 535-36.
17. The proliferation of form leases for residential tenancies has almost completely curtailed effective bargaining. Tenants, wealthy or poor, simply accept whatever terms are contained in the lease or they try elsewhere, usually finding a similar
form lease. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. Rzv. 629 (1943). It has been pointed out that "[c]ourts
have, in other fields, nullified many unconscionable provisions of such 'agreements'."
Schoshinski, supra note 4, at 554. Cf. UNIFORM COMM4RCIAL Cong § 2-302.
18. Schoshinski, supra note 4, at 521.
19. In Baltimore, the Department of Housing and Community Development has
absorbed most of what were once the functions of the Bureau of Building Inspectors.
20. E.g., BALTIMORE, MD., CoDE art. 11, § 138 (1966) provides that violations
of the health ordinances regarding dwellings are misdemeanors and punishable by fines
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non-responsive to their needs. Landlords, on the other hand, maintain
that full code compliance is a practical impossibility which would constitute a tremendous economic burden.
Demanding code compliance is dangerous. As two recent Baltimore cases demonstrate, nothing prevents the landlord from evicting
a tenant because he has complained to officials that the property violates the building code. 21 Sixty days after proper notice to quit, the
court will order eviction; no grounds need be given. This is a common law right to evict based on implied terms of the oral lease, the
legal theory being that the contract is for the same period that the
rent is paid.22 In Baltimore this rule has been limited by a city ordinance which requires that sixty days' notice be given for such evictions even if the tenancy is week to week. 23 Elsewhere in Maryland,
as in many other jurisdictions, thirty days' notice is required. 4
Instances of such retaliation for complaints to authorities are not
unusual. 5 Landlords have even stated to newspaper reporters that
they brought eviction actions because tenants complained.26 While
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has recently held
that retaliatory evictions are not permitted,2" the Baltimore People's
and City Courts have refused to follow the rationale of Judge J. Skelly
Wright and have instead reasoned that legislation is necessary to avoid
the effect of the judge-made law.2"
not exceeding fifty dollars. Fines on occasion can be heavy, since each day's violation
constitutes a separate offense. Id. For a wide variety of housing law violations, two
landlords were fined $2,225. The Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 19, 1968, § A, at 12, col. 1.
21. Sommers v. Goode, No. 8-078979 (Baltimore City Ct., Feb. 4, 1969) in The
Daily Record (Baltimore) Feb. 8, 1969, at 5, col. 1; Weinberg v. Scheper, No.
24453-68 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Nov. 30, 1968) in The Daily Record (Baltimore)
Dec. 5, 1968, at 2, col. 4.
22. 1 AMERICAN LAW Ol PROPERTY § 3.25 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
23. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 349, Oct. 5, 1964, amending CHARTER AND P.L.L.
oF BALTIMORE CITY (1949), § 730A. One of the minor mysteries regarding the ordinance is how the City Council felt empowered to amend an act of the General Assembly.
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 53, § 7 (1957).
25. For example, attempts to use the Baltimore rent escrow law during the first
year after its enactment met with little practical success. Use of rent escrow was
followed by notices to quit in four out of the nine instances it was attempted. Timberfield Realty Corp. v. Brzowsky, No. E09-68, B838692 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Dec.
16, 1968) (notice to quit); Land Holding Co. v. Malone, No. E08-68, B834986
(People's Ct., Baltimore, Dec. 3, 1968); Burman v. Beaman, No. E07-68, B82853i
(People's Ct., Baltimore, Nov. 8, 1968); Stevens v. Middleton, No. E06-68, B823304
(People's Ct., Baltimore, Oct. 21, 1968) (notice to quit) ; Pitts v. Stridarian, No.
E05-68, B819385 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Oct. 7, 1968) ; Hershfield v. Mallory, No.
E04-68, B819056 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Oct. 4, 1968); Baitch v. Chandler, No.
E03-68, B810245 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Sept. 4, 1968) (tenant moved) ; Kaufman
v. Lewis, No. E02-68, B806797 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Aug. 21, 1968) (notice to
quit) ; Mazer v. Waddell, No. E01-68, B802649 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Aug. 7,
1968) (notice to quit).
26. The Sun (Baltimore), Sept. 8, 1968, § C, at 26, col. 1. "The way she put the
law on me isn't the whole story by any means, but it made up my mind. I'm going to
get rid of her." Id. at 24, cols. 3-4.
27. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969).
28. The reasoning of the courts in these decisions is discussed in the text following note 116 infra. The courts did not perceive the problem as one of their brethren's
own making, but simply as an issue more properly resolved by the legislature than
the courts. Unless there are instances of public reliance on past judicial decisions now
perceived to be inadequate or inappropriate, Americans generally have little trouble
in letting judges reshape their own handiwork. This has not been so in every judicial
system. From 1898 until 1966, the House of Lords adhered to a rule that it could not
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As a result of the independent covenant to pay rent, the ten day
summary eviction for failure to pay rent, and the sixty day eviction
for any reason whatever, there has been little reason to argue that the
building code provides an implied covenant of fitness for habitability.
Even if the Maryland Court of Appeals were to declare such an implied covenant, all that would be gained would be a cause of action
for provable damages against the landlord in a separate suit. 9 This
would be a poor substitute for official code enforcement, small comfort
to the evicted tenant, and miniscule power with which to threaten a
landlord to force him to repair.
A direct attack was made in Maryland on the common law incidents of the landlord-tenant relationship. In Jacob Klotzman Co. v.
Wilson, 0 the People's Court of Baltimore entered judgment in favor
of a rent withholding tenant who complained of defective property
when an action was brought for summary eviction. The court ordered
current and future rent paid to the tenant's attorney until the Bureau
of Building Inspectors reported that the sixteen code violations on
the premises were corrected. In a mandamus action against the Baltimore People's Court judge and the tenant's attorney, the Baltimore
Superior Court held that the people's court was without jurisdiction to
entertain such defenses or make such orders. The opinion of the court
is instructive:
I do not have the slightest doubt that there are some instances
where tenants are forced to live under conditions which should
not be permitted to exist in the city of Baltimore, and that there
should be some legislation to correct this overall picture of tenants
being forced into housing accommodations which are inadequate
and defective in many respects . . . . [B]oth sides have expressed
accord today that the problem does exist, that it needs resolution,
and that in all probability, the way to get to it is through the
legislature. 1
Thus we are confronted with the strange specter of judges in the
Baltimore courts publicly holding their noses at the results they reach
and asking the legislature to release them from the bonds of judgemade law. Maryland is not alone in this confusing picture. Most other
jurisdictions exhibit similar judicial reticence. 2 Courts are underreverse its own decisions, and that any reform must be made by Parliament. London
Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council, [18981 A.C. 375, 379, 381. However,
on July 26, 1966, the Lord Chancellor and Lords of Appeal in Ordinary declared
they would no longer be bound by this rule. 63 L. Soc'y GAZE'rU 345 (1966); 110
SOL. J. 584 (1966). For an interesting account, see Birnbaum, Stare Decisis v.
Judicial Activism: Nothing Succeeds Like Success, 54 A.B.A.J. 482 (1968).
29. See notes 13 and 14 supra.
30. B609295 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Aug. 19, 1966).
31. Unpublished opinion of C.J. Dulany Foster, Jacob Klotzman Co. v. Bacharach, No. 102386 at 4 (Super. Ct., Baltimore, Dec. 15, 1966).
32. One indication of the refusal of courts to act is the action of certain Boston
landlords and tenants. Unable to get a resolution of their grievances through ordinary
methods, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court of Justice of the
Associated Synagogues of Massachusetts. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1968, at 1,
col. 4; LAW IN ACTION, Aug. 1968, vol. 3, no. 4, at 1. The decision of the court resulted
in formal grievance procedures and an agreement to submit to binding arbitration.
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standably reluctant to toy openly with laws of property. But if this
is the motivation for the reluctance, it is not well founded. While
landlord-tenant problems present some special policy considerations,
tenants are really consumers of a particular service. The sacrosanct
intention of long dead testators and the contingent interests of unborn
landowners are not present here; neither are we concerned with giving
permanence to a judicial declaration of what are words of purchase.
There is no good reason why the rules of landlord-tenant law cannot
flex to meet current needs just as do rules of some contract and most
tort law.
II.

STATUTORY REFORM

During the last three or four years, several jurisdictions have tried
statutory reforms of their landlord-tenant law in order to aid in the
attack on slum housing. Other methods, as yet untried, have been
suggested by legal commentators. Four types of reform have received
principal attention: improved housing code enforcement, slum property
receivership, rent withholding, and tenant repairs. Each of these offers
distinct advantages and drawbacks, justifying its separate consideration.
Improved Housing Code Enforcement
The proponents of improved housing code enforcement envision a
fundamental change in the administration of the codes. They call for
increased inspections and larger fines imposed through civil liability
to government instead of criminal sanctions." In this way the economic
advantage of code violation would be diminished through increased
liability for infraction. The attendance of the defendant landlord at
trial would not be necessary to impose "civil damages," provided he
was properly served with process."' Moreover, the burden of proof
and other procedural safeguards incident to criminal trials could be
dispensed with."
33. Making code violations criminal acts may help to drive reputable landlords
out of the low rent housing business. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEGAL RIGHTS OF
TENANTS, TENANT'S RIGHTS: LEGAL TOOLS FOR BETTER HouSING 21 (1967).

34. See Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies,
66 COLUM. L. REv. 1254 (1966) ; Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes,
78 HARV. L. REv. 801 (1965). Creating a fiction of "civil action" to dispense with
traditional safeguards attendant to criminal trials would appear to be on shaky constitutional grounds. However, it has been done elsewhere. For example, under the Safety
Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1954), the "plaintiff" government may recover
"damages" for violations of safety standards pertaining to trains even when no accident
occurs. The constitutional battles fought over tkis act have not been on due process
and the burden of proof, but on the commerce clause and whether the statute may be
liberally construed. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904) ; United States
v. Great N. Ry., 229 F. 927 (9th Cir. 1916). The "distinction" between civil and
criminal actions seems to have been accepted by the courts. "The Act is not to be
construed by the rules which govern the construction of criminal statutes. The action
is a civil action to recover a penalty." Id. at 930.
35. For an excellent discussion of the inadequacies attendant to imposing criminal
sanctions and the need for a procedurally more flexible remedy which has the effect
of actually enforcing the housing codes, see Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUm. L. Rsv. 1254 (1966); Note, Enforcement
of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. Rzv. 801 (1965).
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Improved housing code enforcement offers some difficulties. Apart
from its controversial nature, many observers feel it is too expensive
for the return. It would require increased staff on the payrolls of
cities whose budgets are already swollen. The money thus spent would
not itself pay for any repairs. Furthermore, code enforcement is dependent on those whose interest is not directly involved - building
inspectors. The most effective aspect of the proposal is the coercive
effect of increased potential liability for code infraction, a "lever"
which perhaps can be obtained elsewhere.
Receivership
Receivership is a plan to make expensive repairs practicable should
landlords be recalcitrant or lack adequate capital. It is designed to
provide a broad economic base for repairs and also to use the pressure
generated by lending institutions to insure that housing units are kept
safe. Under receivership, a building in disrepair may be taken from
the landlord and put in the hands of a receiver who is empowered to
borrow the necessary capital to make repairs.36 The money thus expended constitutes a prior lien which, like a tax lien, must be satisfied
before any mortgage debt. As with property tax, the mortgagee's
security interest is severely threatened by such a lien. Supporters of
this legislation hope that banks would therefore enforce code compliance on the part of the mortgagor-landlords just as they ensure that
property taxes are paid.37
Receivership has limitations. A court may be reluctant to order
a large building into receivership if only a few of its dwelling units
are in need of repair. Such a reluctance would virtually destroy the
remedy for individual tenants even if they technically have an independent cause of action.38 Moreover, to the extent that landlords perceive
such a judicial reluctance, the overall coercive effect of receivership
is diminished.
The most acute problem, however, is money. Receivership is
hard to operate without state funds to pay for repairs, since receivers
have difficulty obtaining private capital. Banks have refused to make
loans to receivers. They contend that the statutory preference given to
such loans is not constitutional, and that they would therefore not have
adequate security. Because the federal constitutionality of receivership
has not yet been directly settled, it is still open to argument that the
36. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24,
DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney 1965).

§ 11-31-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962); N.Y. MULT.

37. See Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property,

66 COLUM. L. REv. 275, 279-83 (1966).

38. If the receivership action must be brought by some watch-dog agency, then
of course the tenant has no cause of action himself. But even when a tenant may
properly petition for receivership, if the awarding of receivership is dependent upon
a certain percentage of fellow tenants having apartments in serious disrepair, then,
for practical purposes, the tenant still has no independent cause of action. While the
MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 4, § 3-301, would authorize
receivership for serious defects in an apartment building "or any part thereof," it is
difficult to imagine a court ordering a two hundred unit building into receivership if
only one or two units need repair. The Code creates a cause of action only in an
occupying tenant. See note 45 infra.
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Thus banks

have a semblance of legal justification for their position.4 ° But the
constitutionality of receivership should not be seriously in doubt.4
This suggests that the real reason for the banks' refusal is not concern
for the validity of the security in these loans, but rather recognition
that the mortgages they hold on other slum properties would be
threatened. Obviously their refusal to loan to receivers postpones litigation which would likely bring the judicial approval of preference
liens and make banks enforce housing codes in order to protect their

mortgages on slum properties.
But even where state or local money is available to pay for repairs, receivership has suffered since repaired buildings do not seem
to be earning as much as had been hoped.42 This appears to be due
to several reasons. First, the properties placed under receivership will
often be only those which are unprofitable for the landlord to repair
rather than ones owned by landlords without adequate capital or incentive to make repairs to protect their investments. Receivership is
obviously a concentration of such "unprofitable" units. Second, a receiver may have to reach an unrealistically high state of repair - full
housing code compliance. The additional amount of money spent in
reaching this standard over what "fundamental" repairs would cost
may offer only marginal benefit to the affected tenants. Private landlords are typically not required to reach full code compliance. Third,
buildings may be repaired under receivership which are not economically repairable (but which are not necessarily "condemned"). Among
other reasons, this may be done because of a lack of adequate substitute housing.
Evaluating the utility of receivership is difficult. It would seem
improper to conclude that it is a failure if the receiver does not recoup
39. See Note, Preference Liens for the Costs of Repairing Slum Property, 1967
WASH. U.L.Q. 141, 143, citing U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 10.
40. Rosen, Receivership: A Useful Tool for Helping to Meet the Housing Needs
of Low Income People, 3 HARV. Civ. RlrHns-Civ. LiB. L. Rzv. 311, 322 (1968):
The Chicago Title and Trust Company, in spite of a wealth of informed opinion
to the contrary, feels that there is a real danger that the prior lien might be invalidated on constitutional grounds. Therefore, until there is a test case, they
have refused to issue any insurance policies on the certificates [of indebtedness
issued by receivers under the Illinois statute].
41. New York has held that a receivership statute which creates a lien prior to
mortgage security on rents does not constitute an impermissible impairment of contract. In re Department of Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1964). Since this case was decided, the lien has been expanded to make the receiver's
interest prior to the entire security interest of mortgage holders. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL.
§ 309(5) (e) (McKinney Supp. 1968). Compare the problem of procedural due
process discussed at note 87 infra.
The Supreme Court has long held that some impairments of contract are
constitutionally permissible. In Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934), the Court upheld a 1933 Minnesota statutory moratorium against mortgage
foreclosures. It held that the statute was a justifiable exercise of state police power
because of emergency conditions created by the economic depression. Certainly it
could be argued that slum conditions have reached emergency proportions, suggesting
that the Blaisdell reasoning is applicable today. One need not go that far, however,
in justification of the priority. Mechanics' liens for repairs have traditionally been
given priority over mortgages. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODs art. 63, § 15 (1968).
42. See Rosen, Receivership: A Useful Tool for Helping to Meet the Housing
Needs of Low Income People, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. Rxv. 311, 319-20
(1968).
LAW
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the cost of repairs in a reasonable time. Certainly the threat of receivership may have a greater coercive effect than low fines for housing
code violations which are often treated by landlords as a tax. Nevertheless, it is impossible to guess how many repairs are made out of
fear of losing a profitable operation."
One effect of receivership is that it can force a landlord to diminish

his profits or even take a temporary loss in order to protect his overall investment. This effect is particularly evident when an individual
sub-unit may not economically justify its repair. Thus owners of
multiple-unit buildings may be forced to make repairs on sub-units in
order to keep an entire building out of receivership. On the other hand,
single and double units permit a landlord to separate out his "bad
risk" units by permitting them to go into receivership. In Baltimore,
which has a large number of single and double units in low income
neighborhoods, part of the coercive effect of receivership would be
lost. Therefore, the row house diminishes, but does not eliminate, the

utility of receivership.
A corollary of this is that row house receivership would heighten
the likelihood of unprofitable operation by the receiver since the concentration of defective units would be more "pure." The receiver
would have fewer profitable units to help offset the cost of repairing
defective units. Second, row house receivership would be more expensive than apartment receivership since there would be an unavoidable duplication of many "fixed costs" in ordering, setting up,
administering, and accounting for receivership." The cost per unit
43. There is some data. According to Gribetz, 20% of the first 600 cases handled by the Receivership Unit were settled because of compliance by the landlord
prior to formal proceedings in the case. Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. Rtv. 1254, 1273 n.87 (1966). How
many repairs were made because of the possibility of receivership instead of actual
complaint is imponderable.
44. Avoiding the repetition of fixed costs is the economic underpinning of class
actions. In a sense receivership of a large apartment building is a class action brought
on behalf of all tenants in the building. This suggests that class actions may be a way
around the seeming inutility of receivership in row house towns such as Baltimore
and Philadelphia, assuming the jurisdiction has a receivership statute. An objection
to this notion which immediately comes to mind is that there is no identity of issues
for the class to litigate. However, this is probably not a sound objection. The issue
is whether the properties have wrongfully gone without landlord repair and whether
the state of disrepair is grave enough to justify the strong medicine of receivership.
The particular repairs to be made may differ just as they do within one large apartment building. The aggregate of proof would really not be much different than with
one large building. Apartment building receivership is not limited to instances where
the common property (stairs or furnace, for example) is in disrepair, but also contemplates situations where so many of the individual apartments are dilapidated that
relief will be given.
The real difficulties behind tenant class actions for receivership lie in questions of local procedure, and perhaps more importantly, problems of forming tenant
organizations along landlord rather than neighborhood lines. Social workers and
community action leaders find trouble enough attempting to organize neighborhood
tenant organizations. Slum neighborhoods are often diffuse, typically peopled by
transients and unsophisticated people who are often hesitant to join organizations.
Even if these obstacles can be overcome, organization will do little for tenants whose
landlords are not large operators. They would still have to depend on less powerful
individual actions. Yet, with all these problems, receivership class actions may offer
enough economic leverage to coerce recalcitrant landlords with large slum holdings
to improve the state of repair of their properties so as to make this a worthwhile
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would undoubtedly be higher, all other factors equal, than with multiple
dwelling units. Nevertheless, receivership is an idea that deserves
serious legislative consideration.45
Rent Withholding
A more attractive plan for some purposes is rent withholding.4"

Withholding and "rent escrow" avoid the natural judicial reticence
to employ the strong medicine of receivership, a reticence which works
to the tenant's disadvantage where less expensive repairs are to be
made. The potential advantage of rent withholding seems to be twofold: first, it can provide an economic incentive to repair the premises
and second, it can create a small potential fund, accumulated rent, to
pay for repairs without incurring the expense of receivership.
Some distinctions are necessary in order to assess rent withholding techniques. Rent withholding differs from rent escrow in that
withholding means that the tenant keeps the rent and escrow means
that he pays it to a third party stakeholder. Rent withholding is
distinct from rent abatement in that witheld rent would be paid when
repairs were made, but abated rent would not.4 7 A defensive remedy
is one which may be employed only after a landlord starts eviction
proceedings, while an offensive remedy permits judicial determination
effort. Thus the threat of a tenant class action could enhance the effect of receivership legislation in row-house slums.
Such tenant class actions could be thought of as joining the burgeoning ambit
of consumer class actions, sharing problems not even alluded to here. See, e.g., Dole,
Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968
DUKE L.J. 1101; Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part I: Considerations of
Equity, 49 BosT. U.L. Rgv. 211 (1969).
45. Receivership is an important part of the MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDTENANT CODE, supra note 4, §§ 3-301 to 3-307. Enforcement is dependent upon tenant
initiation (Q 3-301) but admits of government intervention (Q 3-302(3)). This is
probably not enough to permit government initiation, and hence seems unnecessarily
narrow. More importantly, it is limited in application to apartment buildings, although
that term, as defined by §§ 1-205 and 1-206, is rather broad. This is probably an
indication that the Code was written against the background of cities such as Chicago
and New York, where multiple dwelling units are the norm, rather than Baltimore
and Philadelphia.

46. One of the most serious omissions of the

MODEL

RESIDENTIAL

LANDLORD-

TENANT CODE, supra note 4, is its failure to make adequate use of rent withholding

or escrow. Instead, it relies principally on receivership (§§ 3-301 to 3-307) and
repair and deduct (§ 2-206). But where the repairs to be made do not justify receivership or where the tenant cannot afford the luxury of "loaning" the landlord repair
money under the repair and deduct concept, the tenant is largely without protection.
Similarly, the expansion by the Code (§§ 2-204 and 2-205) of the tenant's right to
terminate is a remedy of dubious utility for the poor tenant who is likely to find no
better conditions elsewhere. The need for rent withholding or escrow is further
emphasized by the limited scope of rent abatement in the Code. Section 2-207(1)
provides that the tenant may, when the landlord fails to supply hot water, either
terminate the rental agreement or keep one-fourth of the rent. Pursuant to § 2-207(2),
the tenant may terminate the agreement or procure adequate substitute housing at the
landlord's expense for failure to provide a reasonable amount of water or heat. Thus,
the rent abatement in the Code only applies to heat, water and hot water. This and
the fact that rent abatement penalizes a landlord without creating a source of money
for repair illustrate the significance of the omission of rent withholding or escrow
from the Code.
47. Pennsylvania has enacted a mixed system. Rent is paid into court for six
months, and, if the landlord has not made repairs by that time, the money is returned
to the tenant. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (1969).
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before the tenancy is jeopardized. In addition, offensive remedies may
be divided into tenant initiated and agency initiated remedies. Tenant
initiated remedies permit the tenant to bring his own affirmative action,
while agency initiated remedies require a health, housing, welfare, or
similar bureaucratic agency to bring the action on the tenant's behalf.
Adding differing procedural settings to these variables, it can easily
be appreciated that rent withholding and rent escrow, where they are
available, present a rather interesting collage.
Defensive rent withholding and escrow exist in several jurisdictions.4" With these remedies the aggrieved tenant withholds rent if the
landlord refuses to repair. Proof of the defect and of the landlord's
refusal to repair after notice constitutes a defense to eviction for failure
to pay rent. In the sense that the tenant takes the initiative by withholding rent when repairs are not forthcoming, it appears to be an
offensive remedy. However, the eviction action is the landlord's suit,
and should the defense fail, the tenant is evicted.49 This demonstrates
one real disadvantage of a defensive remedy: the tenant may be required to guess, at his peril, whether the defect for which he withheld
rent was justified.5"
The defensive nature of the remedy has certain advantages. Placing the burden of commencing legal action on the part of poor, unsophisticated tenants who are, for the most part, unfamiliar with or
untrusting of lawyers, will inhibit the use of the remedy. For such
tenants, provided the grounds are clear-cut, the danger of a defensive
remedy is outweighed by the relative ease of giving notice and withholding rent until an eviction action is commenced. Furthermore, if
rent withholding truly becomes an operative part of the landlord-tenant
relationship, real bargaining between the parties may emerge. Then
48. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ActioNs LAW §§ 769-82 (McKinney Supp. 1968);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24.2-11 (Supp. 1968).
49. Eviction is subject to a right of redemption which the tenant may have. See
note 78 infra. To redeem, a tenant may not only have to pay all back rent, but also
certain costs.
50. A major failing of the MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra
note 4, is that it would permit retaliatory eviction in instances where the tenant in
good faith notified building inspectors of defects or even merely requested the landlord
to repair defects if no Code violation existed at the time. § 2-407(2) (f). Thus the
tenant must wager his tenancy against his interpretation of the housing code. The
commentary, in justification of this policy choice, puts forth three reasons: 1) that a
landlord whose property is in code compliance is not likely to be angered by complaints; 2) that "this is an additional impetus to the landlord to bring his building
into compliance with codes"; and 3) that it is doubtful policy to restrict a property
owner's right to select tenants without some fault on the landlord's part. Id. at 70-71.
It is suggested that two of these three ideas cannot stand close examination.
First, if a landlord is not likely to be angered by complaints when the property is in
full code compliance, then not much is taken from him by denying him retaliatory
eviction in return for encouraging good faith complaints and requests to repair. Second,
the additional impetus to the landlord to bring the property into Code compliance is
hard to see. If landlords are to meet Code standards the impetus is not the hope that
they will be able to evict tenants in retaliation for making complaints. The real
justification for the policy choice must be the freedom of selection argument: making
a landlord keep a tenant six months longer than he would like is a small encroachment which would result in giving tenants fundamental protection in their effort to
improve their conditions. This is particularly so since it is not hard to imagine a
civilized legal system which would require good cause for all evictions. See note 107
infra and accompanying text.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

XXIX

the defensive remedy would appear to enable less sophisticated tenants
to take part in this bargaining process with greater ease. 5'
On the other hand, where a tenant has a more doubtful case,
requiring him to wager his tenancy to give definition to a new statutory procedure would inhibit him from exercising what may turn out
to be a well-founded complaint. This is not an illusory quibble. Where
the grounds for withholding are vague standards, 2 the problem for
the tenant becomes quite real. It would appear important, then, that
both offensive and defensive remedies appear in any well-planned
statutory scheme.
The choice between rent withholding and rent escrow seems a bit
easier. Permitting a tenant to withhold rent provides him with an
economic incentive to commit waste to the leased premises if he does
not have the rent money. He has nothing to lose. If he convinces
the court that the defective condition is the landlord's responsibility,
he can continue his tenancy without paying rent. Should he fail to
do so, he is in no worse position than if he had not damaged the
property since he would have been evicted anyway. Landlords are
usually not interested in spending additional legal fees in getting judgments against those who are, for practical purposes, recovery proof.
Moreover, leaving accumulated rent in the hands of a poor tenant would
jeopardize a potentially growing fund which might pay for repairs.53
Such a provision would endanger the passage of proposed legislation,
since landlords, who maintain that many of the repairs they make are
necessitated by vandalism,54 would be inalterably opposed to rewarding
intentional property damage, no matter how small the actual number
of cases.
Rent withholding, as a remedy, does not seem to be as desirable
as rent escrow. However, it has a proper place in a well-organized
statutory set-up because it serves the legitimate function of initiating
"defensive" rent escrow. Since an unpaid landlord can reasonably be
expected to start eviction proceedings quickly, withholding rent is a
relatively simple way for an aggrieved tenant to "get into" court.
Once he is there, it is not unfair to require him to pay both back and
future rent into court55 where it will be held in "escrow" until the
necessary repairs are made. Requiring him to do so eliminates the
potential economic incentive to commit waste. Without this type of
withholding, the burden would be on the tenant to commence the action.
There are agency initiated remedies within the scope of rent withholding. In New York City many welfare recipients have their rent
paid directly by the Welfare Department.5 6 When a landlord of such
51. So far the most realistic gains in tenant bargaining power seem to have come
through tenant unions rather than through the existence of any particular remedy,
but organizing poor tenants who are likely to be transients in communities where there
are large amounts of single and double dwelling units is difficult. See note 44 supra.
52. See note 77 infra and accompanying text.
53. One of the failings of the MODL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENAN'r COD, supra
note 4, is that it provides for rent abatement rather than rent escrow. See note 46 supra.
54. See The Sun (Baltimore), Aug. 4, 1969, § C, at 20, col. 7.
55. The court might, however, order the rent diminished. See note 88 infra and
accompanying text.
56. N.Y. Soc. SPRVICEs LAW § 143-b (McKinney 1966).
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a tenant fails to repair the premises, the department is empowered to

investigate the facts and, if substantiated, to withhold rent payments.5 7
This has the advantage of obviating the economic incentive to commit
waste. It serves to verify the complaint and tends to insulate the
tenant from the hazard of guessing whether it is a rent-impairing
defect. However, it is dependent on bureaucratic concern which is
indirect, and bureaucratic judgment which may differ from that of the
courts as to what justifies rent withholding, a judgment which well
may not vindicate some interests nor seek judicial definition of uncertain
areas.5 It is limited to welfare recipients who live under a system
which does not trust them to handle personal affairs, a kind of paternalism which does not encourage people to assume responsibility and
break out of a position of dependency.
In Illinois, 59 Massachusetts,6 New Jersey," l and Pennsylvania 2
there are procedures for agencies to initiate rent withholding or rent
escrow. Of these, only Massachusetts makes provision for the initiation of proceedings by both the tenant and the respective agency.6 3
While it is helpful to have "watch-dog" agencies protecting private
interests, there does not seem to be any compelling reason why tenants
should be forced to rely solely on them.
Tenant Repair
In addition to the other major types of reform directed toward
the landlord-tenant problem - improved housing code enforcement,
receivership, and rent withholding or escrow - there are lesser
remedies. 4 Notable among these are the California Civil Code provisions.6 5 After receiving notice from a tenant that the leased premises
violate the housing code, a landlord has a reasonable time to make
repairs. If the landlord fails to repair, the tenant may vacate the
premises and thereby be released from paying rent, or have the repairs
made himself and deduct the expense from the next rent payment. 66
57. Id.
58. Cf. Sax and Hiestand, supra note 4; Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 HARv. L. Rtv. 801 (1965).

59. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
60. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 127A-J (1966).
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :42-77 (1968) ("rent control").
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
63. See note 60 supra.

§ 1700-1 (1969).

64. In addition to the broad range of remedies discussed in this article there has

even been the suggestion that courts make "slumlordism" a tort. See Sax and Hiestand,
supra note 4; Sax, Slumlordism as a Tort - A Brief Response, 66 MIcH. L. Riv. 465
(1968). But see Blum and Dunham, Slumlordism as a Tort - A Dissenting View,

66 MICH. L. Rzv. 451 (1968).
65. CAL. CiV. CoDX §§ 1941-42 (West 1954).
66. Id. Similar provisions are found in LA. Civ. CoDs ANN. arts. 2692-94 (West
1952); MONT. REv. Coozs ANN. §§ 42-201, 202 (1947) ; N.D. CtNT. COD- §§ 47-16-12,
13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41,

§§ 31, 32 (1954); S.D. CoMPmtD

LAWS §§

43-32-8, 9 (1967).
Repair and deduct is, for practical purposes, a common law remedy in some
jurisdictions. Where a tenant is permitted to plead a violation of the lease agreement
in mitigation or set-off to an action by the landlord for unpaid rent, the tenant has,
in effect, the right to repair and deduct, since the cost of repairs would be recoverable
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The right to vacate does not seem to be much of a remedy for
poor tenants who are likely to have week to week or month to month
tenancies; for practical purposes they already have that remedy and
it does them no good. The trouble and expense of moving, including
time lost from work, makes it too expensive. The right to vacate may
do something for middle class individuals whose written leases purport
to relieve the landlords of the obligation to repair."
The interesting part of this statutory plan is the right to repair
and deduct. Limited to a maximum of one month's rent in some jurisdictions,6 8 this remedy is suited to inexpensive repairs which may be
quite important. Many electrical, plumbing, and heating repairs may
fall within this category, disputes over which should not require the
tenant to institute legal action. If the landlord elects to contest the
deduction, he may do so by bringing an action for rent or eviction
for failure to pay rent, contending that the condition did not exist, or
that it was the tenant's fault.
The repair and deduct remedy is not useful for large repairs.
It also has the disadvantage of requiring an expenditure of "rent"
money before rent is due in order to pay for the repairs. Nevertheless,
repair and deduct is a sensible complement to other tenants' remedies.69

III.

MARYLAND'S

LEGISLATIVE ACTION

Before the 1968 legislative session, numerous unsuccessful attempts were made to enact legislation which would permit tenants to
withhold rent or put it in escrow when landlords refused to repair.7"
On May 7, 1968, the Governor of Maryland approved Senate Bill
by the tenant in an action against the landlord. See MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDTENANT CODE, supra note 4, at 38.
This is operative only where mitigation or set-off may be pleaded in the
landlord's action as opposed to a separate tenant's action for damages, and only when
the landlord has violated an explicit promise in the lease to repair. This limitation
severely circumscribes its utility to poor tenants with one-sided oral or written leases.
Moreover, in many jurisdictions the remedy of repair and deduct can be avoided by
bringing an action for eviction on the grounds of a default in rent. Id. at 39.

67. The

MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE,

supra note 4, places con-

69. The

MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT

supra note 4, places con-

siderable emphasis on the right to vacate. §§ 2-204, 2-205, 2-207, and 2-208. While
this may be a mis-appraisal of the utility of an expanded right of constructive eviction
to poor tenants, it is probably better seen as an indication of the broad range of
purposes to which the Code was intended to serve.
68. The California statute limits the amount to the equivalent of one month's
rent and the right is waivable by contract. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West 1954). The
MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 4, suggests a limitation of
fifty dollars which could be increased to one month's rent if the tenant submits "a
written estimate by a qualified workman at least [four weeks] before having the work
done...." § 2-206 (1).
CODE,

siderable reliance on the remedy of repair and deduct. § 2-206. Low income tenants
though are not likely to benefit greatly from this remedy. They will probably lack the
money to "loan" their landlord for the cost of necessary repairs. Inevitably, some might
pay for repairs in expectation of a deduction from rent only to find the landlord able
to persuade the court that the repairs were not necessary. In the latter case, the
landlord could apparently evict the tenant in retaliation for having made a complaint
in good faith when the premises were in full Code compliance. § 2-407(2) (f). In
effect the evicted tenant would make a gift of repairs to the landlord without deriving
any benefit from them.
70. See, e.g., MD.H.B. 867, 1967 Sess.; MD.H.B. 636, 1967 Sess.; MD.H.B. 633,
1967 Sess.; MD.H.B. 410, 1967 Sess.; MD.H.B. 458, 1966 Sess. All died in committee.
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130 providing for a form of rent escrow in the City of Baltimore.7T
This new law creates a tenant's remedy by providing a new defense
to a landlord's action or proceeding to recover either rent or possession
of the premises. For practical purposes, this new defense would almost
71. Ch. 459, [1968] Md. Laws 832. The new law is relatively short and it is here
set out in full in order to help the examination of its provisions. Included are additions and deletions as shown in the Maryland Laws of 1968.
AN ACT to add new Section 459A to the Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1949 Edition, being Article 4 of the Code of Public Local Laws
of Maryland), title "Baltimore City," subtitle "Landlord and Tenant," to follow
immediately after Section 459 thereof, as last amended by Chapter 176 of the
Acts of 1955, to authorize a tenant of leased premises in Baltimore City to raise
certain defenses in actions based on rent due, to provide conditions for this
defense and rebuttal thereof, and authorize the issuance of certain orders in such
cases, allowing a set-off under certain circumstances for rent due, PROVIDE
FOR CERTAIN SAFEGUARDS FOR TENANTS UNDER CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO MAKE OTHER PROVISIONS IN RELATION THERETO.
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the General Asgembly of Maryland, That new
Section 459A be and it is hereby added to the Code of Public Local Laws of
Baltimore City (1949 Edition, being Article 4 of the Code of Public Local Laws
of Maryland), title "Baltimore City," subtitle "Landlord and Tenant," to follow
immediately after Section 459 thereof, as last amended by Chapter 176 of the Acts
of 1955, and to read as follows:
459A.
(a) In an action of distress for rent or in any complaint proceeding brought
by a landlord to recover rent or the possession of leased premises for nonpayment of rent (including a proceeding brought under Section 456 hereof), where
the property is leased for residential use for a term of one year or less, the tenant
may assert as a defense, in addition to any other defenses authorized by law, that
there exists upon the leased premises, or [upon the common property] THE
PROPERTY USED IN COMMON of which the leased premises form a part,
a condition which constitutes, or if not promptly corrected, will constitute, a fire
hazard or a serious threat to the life, health or safety of occupants thereof, including but not limited to, a lack of heat or of running [COLD AND HOT]
water or of light or of electricity or of adequate sewage disposal facilities or an
infestation of rodents. l[or vermin.]
(b) The assertion of the defense provided for in subsection (a) shall be conditioned upon the following:
(1) Prior to the commencement of the action of distress for rent or the
complaint, the landlord or his agent was notified in writing by certified mail of
the aforesaid condition or conditions by the tenant or was notified by a violation
or condemnation notice from an appropriateState or municipal agency, but that
the landlord has refused, or having a reasonable opportunity to do so, has failed
to remedy the same.
(2) Payment by the tenant into court of the amount of rent [stated in the
action of distress for rent to be in arrears or stated in the complaint to be due
and unpaid,] FOUND BY THE COURT TO BE DUE AND UNPAID, to
be held by the Court pending the issuance of an order under subsection (d) of
this section.
(c) It shall be a sufficient answer to such a defense if the landlord or his
agent establishes that:
(1) The condition or conditions alleged in the defense does not in fact exist
or that such condition or conditions have been removed or remedied; or
(2) Such condition or conditions have been caused by the tenant or members
of the family of such tenant or of their guests; or
(3) The tenant has UNREASONABLY refused entry to the owner or
his agent to the premises for the purpose of correcting such condition or conditions(;] or
[(4) The conditions were known by the tenant to exist prior to the letting
of the premises.]
(d) The Court shall make findings of fact upon any defense raised under
this section or the answer to any defense and, thereafter, shall pass such order
as the justice of the case shall require, including any one or more of the following:
(1) An order [or judgment which includes a] OF set-off to the tenant as
determined by the Court in such amount as may be equitable to represent the
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always be raised in an action for ten day summary eviction for failure
to pay rent. The defense is that the landlord has failed to correct
a defect on the leased or common premises which constitutes "a fire
hazard or a serious threat to the life, health or safety of occupants
thereof, including but not limited to, a lack of heat or of running
water or of light or of electricity or of adequate sewage disposal
facilities or an infestation of rodents." 7 The law provides that assertion of this defense is "conditioned upon": the landlord having been
notified of the defect prior to commencement of the proceedings either
by certified mail from the tenant or by a violation or condemnation
notice from an appropriate governmental agency ;73 the landlord having failed or refused to correct the defect;74 and "[p]ayment by the
tenant into court of the amount of rent found by the court to be
due and unpaid. . .. ",'
Although the new law provides a defensive tenant's remedy, the
tenant must take some action to be able to assert the defense. Some
existence of any condition set forth in subsection (a) of this section which is
found by the Court to exist.
(2) Terminate the lease or order surrender of the premises to the landlord.
(3) Refer any matter before the Court to the proper State, or municipal
agency for investigation and report and grant a continuance of the action or
complaint pending receipt of such investigation and report. When such a continuance is granted, the tenant shall deposit with the Court any rents which will
become due during the period of continuance, to be held by the Court pending
its further order[.] OR IN ITS DISCRETION THE COURT MAY USE
SUCH FUNDS TO PAY A MORTGAGE ON THE PROPERTY IN
ORDER TO STAY A FORECLOSURE.
(e) If it shall appear that the tenant has raised a defense under this section
in bad faith, or has caused the violation or has UNREASONABLY refused
entry to the landlord or his agent for the purpose of correcting the condition
giving rise to the violation, the Court, in its discretion, may impose upon the
tenant the reasonable costs of the landlord, including counsel fees and court
costsi.l AND THE COSTS OF REPAIR WHERE THE COURT FINDS
THE TENANT HAS CAUSED THE VIOLATION.
(f) Any provision of a lease or other agreement whereby any provision of
this section for the benefit of a tenant, resident or occupant of a dwelling is
waived, shall be deemed against public policy and shall be void.
[(G) NO TENANT SHALL BE SUBJECT TO AN INCREASE IN
RENT OR EVICTION FOR MAKING SUCH COMPLAINT FOR A
PERIOD OF ONE YEAR OR FOR THE UNEXPIRED PORTION OF
ANY LEASE IF IT BE FOR LESS THAN ONE YEAR FOLLOWING
DETERMINATION OF THE MERITS BY THE COURT, UNLESS
THE COURT FINDS THE COMPLAINT BY THE TENANT HAS
BEEN RAISED FRIVOLOUSLY OR UNLESS THE COURT FINDS
THE RENT HAS BEEN INCREASED OR THE TENANT EVICTED
FOR GOOD CAUSE.]
Snc. 2. And be it further enacted, That all laws or parts of laws, public
general or public local, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed to the extent of any such inconsistency.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That this Act shall take effect July 1, 1968.
EDIrO's No'rx: The following format has been adopted in lieu of that appearing
in Laws of Maryland:
Italics indicate new matter added to existing law.
CAPITALS indicate amendments to bill.
[Brackets] indicate matter stricken out of bill.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. § l(a).
Id. § l(b)(1).
Id.
Id. § l(b) (2).
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insist that it is unfair to require poor tenants, perhaps illiterate and
unlikely to be familiar with the post office except on a most elementary level, to send formal written notification to landlords about defects
in order to raise the defense. Landlords may fear that without this
measure they will go to needless expense in bringing fruitless eviction proceedings. At any rate, producing a receipt for a certified letter
is likely to go far to cut off dilatory quibbling concerning whether
the defense is properly before the court.76 This is a requirement which
tenants' organizations can help their members meet. The alternative
is to complain to the building inspectors. If they issue a violation
notice and if the tenant learns of it, then he may withold rent if the
repairs are not made.
A more serious objection is that the Rent Escrow Act forces
tenants to guess at their peril whether a defect constitutes a "fire
hazard or a serious threat to the life, health or safety of occupants"
of the leased premises. Since the enumeration which follows the
phrase is, by its terms, merely representative of defects which might
justify the defense,77 this important speculation could apply to a large
number of conditions. The danger to tenants in guessing which
defects qualify is the risk of eviction and even payment of landlords'
counsel fees.
Ordinarily a tenant in default may redeem and avoid eviction
by paying back rent and costs (not attorneys' fees) within the specified
period."' Two questions arise because of the new statute. First,
whether the eviction clause 79 permits eviction without redemption
and second, whether the "in terrorem" clause,80 when read with the
eviction clause, permits such evictions. For what seem to be sound
reasons, the answer to both questions should be "no."
It might be argued that the eviction clause, which permits the
court to "terminate the lease or order the surrender of the premises
to the landlord," allows the court to evict without redemption by
the tenant. The theory would be that by failing to provide for redemption explicitly, the legislature intended the act to be a partial repealer
of the right to redemption. The eviction clause, however, was quite
evidently inserted to permit the court to order eviction and does not
deal with the procedures or limitations on evictions. The Rent Escrow
Act was not designed to supplant the old law but to add a defense
76. The time to repair runs from the date of receipt of formal notice; actual
notice will not suffice. See The Sun (Baltimore), Aug. 12, 1969, § C, at 20, col. 5
(discussing a people's court decision where the landlord had actual notice but the
formal written notice requirement had not been fulfilled).
77. The listing of qualifying defects reads in part:
[A] condition which constitutes, or if not promptly corrected, will constitute, a
fire hazard or a serious threat to the life, health or safety of occupants thereof,
including but not limited to, a lack of heat or of running water or of light or of
electricity or of adequate sewage disposal facilities or an infestation of rodents.
Ch. 459, § 1 (a) [1968] Md. Laws 832.
78. CHARTER & P.L.L. op BALTIMORE CITY (1949) § 459 permits a tenant the
right to redeem by paying back rent and costs within the time fixed by the judge.
79. Ch. 459, § 1(d) (2) [1968] Md. Laws 832.

80. Ch. 459, § 1(e) [1968] Md. Laws 832.
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not previously recognized.81 Negative repealers are not typical devices
in statutory drafting. Taking away the substantial right to redemption should not be presumed from an oblique statutory construction.
Whether the "in terrorem" or "bad faith" subsection, when read
with the apparently unqualified power to order eviction, permits eviction without redemption, is a related question. It might be asserted
that where a tenant raised the defense in "bad faith," or where he
actually caused the defect complained of, he ought not be entitled to
the right of redemption. This argument would not seem to comport
with sound construction or policy. First, the "in terrorem" clause
contains explicit punishment. Costs, including counsel fees and court
costs may be awarded to the landlord when the defense is raised in
"bad faith." In addition, the cost of repairs may be awarded when
the tenant has caused the defect complained of in the defense. Additional sanctions would not seem justified. Second, the right to redemption is an essential one which mitigates the harsh right of the landlord
to demand summary eviction for failure to pay rent. Indeed, the only
justification for the landlord's power is the valid presumption of
irrevocable loss of rent. When rent is not threatened, there is no
justification for imposing summary eviction.
Although the statute cannot reasonably be read as directly limiting redemption, there is a possibility that it might do so indirectly.
If attorneys' fees were awarded to the landlord because the tenant
raised the defense in "bad faith," the tenant might be able to pay rent,
but not the fees. Would the landlord be permitted to insist on payment of the attorneys' fees first? In addition to providing greater
sanction than the statute calls for on its face, conditioning a tenant's
retention of possession on payment of more than the rent does not
seem to have any good policy justification. 2 If the reason for summary eviction is to protect the landlord from irrevocable loss of rent,
that end is not served by denying redemption. Furthermore, there
does not seem to be any good reason for granting special collection
powers for recovering a "debt" for attorneys' fees.
The basic propriety of the "in terrorem" clause seems to be
doubtful. Apparently it is designed to insulate landlords from captious
assertions of the defense of rent escrow. Perhaps it is "fair" to keep
the landlord from having to pay the attorneys' fees in order to refute
a specious defense. However, no correlative protection is accorded
to the tenant for his attorneys' fees when the landlord brings the
eviction in "bad faith." 3 For the poor tenant whose income is just
above entitlement for legal aid, payment of attorneys' fees may be
81. See Baltimore People's Court, Part XXIV, right to pay rent into court, 1
Judgment of Restitution, printed in THE LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE, Oct. 1968, Vol.
XXVII, No. I at page 25. This rule, which was adopted in response to the passage
of the Rent Escrow Act, recognizes the right of the tenant to redeem.
82. Cf. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 4, § 2-304(1) (a)
(which provides that upon the tenant's failure to properly maintain the leased premises,
the landlord may remedy the failure, and treat the expenses so incurred as rent).
83. But see MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 4, § 2-407(3)
(providing that a tenant from whom possession has been improperly recovered may
receive three months rent or threefold the damages sustained, including reasonable
attorney's fees).
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very important.8 4 Whether counsel fees should be awarded generally
is a subject frought with debate, 5 but, if they are going to be permitted, why not on an equal basis ?6 Since a similar club is not held
over the landlord, perhaps this is a denial of equal protection of the
laws offensive to the fourteenth amendment.
Summing up the "in terrorem" subsection, it would seem that,
where the tenant raised a defense which was recognized, he would get
the relief of being permitted to pay rent into court. Where he raised,
in good faith, a defense held not to justify rent withholding, eviction
may ensue, but the right to redemption is not cut off. In those cir84. One of the most interesting provisions of the MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-

TENANT CODE, supra note 4, is the requirement that indigent tenants be given court
appointed counsel.
In any proceeding brought by or for a landlord against a tenant to recover possession of his dwelling unit, the court shall inform the tenant of his right to counsel,
and if the tenant is unable to afford his own, the court shall appoint counsel....
Id. at § 3-101(1).
While superficially attractive, this proposition requires far more discussion
than the meager fifteen-line commentary offered by the writers of the Code to the
effect that when one's home is at issue, counsel should be required.
This is not to dispute the general idea that where there are issues to be
litigated, indigents should have counsel. Indeed, it is relatively simple to make the
legal argument that there is even a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases. See,
e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. Rev. 1322 (1967)
and Note, Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967). The
social and economic effects of such a "right" are more difficult to work out. The
same may be said of this section.
First, it would greatly slow down the handling of eviction actions, or require
many more courts and judges. The preponderance of eviction actions are summary
proceedings to evict for failure to pay rent. In practice most tenants never appear,
and the cases are disposed of in "rubber stamp" fashion. The provision would require
court-appointed counsel "in any proceeding" of eviction. Would it be necessary for
defendants to appear personally to be advised of their rights? Landlords could not
be expected to acquiesce in such a practice. In addition to the delays thus engendered,
defendants could avoid summary ejectment by never appearing voluntarily to be
advised of their rights. This could be prevented by advising tenants of their rights
in the pleadings, a less effective approach. Still, dilatory tactics could be expected
from counsel. If nothing else could be done, evictions could be delayed. It may be
important to make reforms in eviction actions to insure that tenants are aware of the
proceedings and to keep them from losing fundamental rights in summary actions
which are, for practical purposes, ex parte. Nevertheless, this provision would not
seem to be the way to do it.
Second, the cost may be too great for the return. The right to counsel in
civil cases is a desirable goal, but granting counsel in every eviction action may be
starting from the wrong end. It would obviously require a substantial reallocation
of the scarce commodity of justice (in which legal services are included) to eviction
cases. Legal representation in such cases may be desirable, but there surely are higher
priorities. See Hazard, Rationing Justice, 8 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1965).
85. See REPORT, ABA COMM. ON COMPARATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, PROCZ4DINGS INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION 117, 118 (1962); Ehrenz-

weig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIP. L. Rgv. 792
(1966); Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 872-77 (1929).
86. The MODEL REsIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 4, would invalidate lease provisions which allow recovery of attorney's fees by either party. § 3-402.
The Code views any court proceedings by either party as less desirable than negotiation or the pursuit of another remedy under the Code. To this end, a lease
provision holding one party responsible for the other's legal expenses cannot be
allowed, since it allows the latter to enter court with less expense, thus ensuring
that he will be more likely to do so....
Id. at 19.
Compare this policy of discouraging litigation with the change in eviction proceedings which might result from adoption of the MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TZNANT
CODX'S provision for appointment of counsel for indigent tenants discussed in note 84
supra.
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cumstances the court should exercise its discretion to refuse to order
eviction, provided the rent is paid, and save the tenant "costs." Where
the defense is raised in "bad faith," attorneys' fees may be charged
against the tenant, provided this is constitutional, and eviction ordered.
However, the right to redemption should not be cut off.
A serious omission in the list of possible orders the court can
employ is the failure specifically to empower the court to order the
landlord, under the risk of contempt, to make repairs. A similar
hiatus is the failure to empower the court to pay for repairs through
the offices of the clerk or to permit the appointment of an administrator to do so should a landlord remain recalcitrant. One of the
virtues of rent escrow is that it permits the accumulation of money
for repairs. The failure specifically to provide this device is unfortunate, but perhaps it is implicit in the statute. The source would seem
to be the broad power in subsection (d) to "pass such order as the
justice of the case shall require, including any one or more of the
following." It might be argued that "including" is somehow more
narrow than the phrase "including but not limited to" which is used
preceding representative defects. Thus it might be asserted that
only orders very similar to those listed would be permissible. Furthermore, the original bill was amended to give specific authorization to
pay a mortgagee in order to stay foreclosure." If it was thought
that specific authorization was needed for this, then how can the
statute be interpreted to allow a court to pay laborers and materialmen?
In addition to being contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory language, this restrictive interpretation should fail for other reasons as well. Obviously the court must be able to dispose of the rents
it receives. Other than the broad power to "pass such order as the
justice of the case shall require," the statute wholly fails to tell the
court what to do with the money once it has it other than to permit
payment to prevent mortgage foreclosure. While courts may be understandably reluctant to supervise the repair of slum housing, it is
appropriate to do so on the rare occasions when keeping rents from
87. Ch. 459, § 1(d) (3) [1968] Md. Laws 832. There is the argument that failure
to permit payment of the mortgage out of collected funds would constitute an impairment of contract which would be forbidden by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution. If receivership is constitutional, however, there would
be no sound reason why a device, which was designed to enhance enforcement of local
building codes and which actually resulted in less impairment of the security interest,
should be unconstitutional. See notes 39-41 supra.
The real problem is procedural due process. Since mortgages typically give
the mortgagee a lien on rents when the mortgagor defaults, there is an obligation
which rent withholding would impair. While such an impairment may pass constitutional muster, the lienholder has a legitimate concern in appearing at the hearing
which may adversely affect his security interest. Therefore, failure to notify the
lienholder of the action might result in a denial of procedural due process. An early
New York receivership statute was held unconstitutional in that it failed to provide
for notification of lienholders. Central Say. Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266,
18 N.E.2d 151 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939). A subsequent statute which
required such notification was held constitutional. In re Department of Bldgs., 14
N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964).
Thus the provision of the rent withholding act which permits withheld rent
to be disbursed to pay a mortgage avoids encumbering the action with procedural
complexities. At the same time, it pro tanto diminishes the lienholder's motivation to
insure that the property is kept up to minimal standards. See Levi, note 37 supra.
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landlords is insufficient to induce them to repair. Under the proper
circumstances, the court should exercise the power to order the landlord to have the repairs made, order the appointment of an administrator to have the repairs made, order the payment of the repairmen
out of the accumulated rent, or order the return of the withheld rent
to the landlord. The apparent legislative intent behind the general
grant of power was to create an equity-like flexibility. This conclusion is strongly supported by the power to order a set-off in favor of
the tenant because of defective conditions."" Such broad powers are
what the occasion demands.
A more serious problem in statutory construction is presented
by the short enumeration of defects which will justify the defense."9
Particularly interesting is the legislative deletion of the words "cold
and hot" and "vermin." There are two ways of interpreting these
deletions: 1) lack of hot water and infestation of vermin do not raise
the defense at all or 2) they do not raise the defense as a matter of
law, but the court is still free to find that they do. These are serious
matters. Baltimore is certainly in the cockroach belt. If there is infested property in common in multiple dwelling units, tenant care
and cleanliness may be of no avail. On the other hand, if the tenant
has caused or is substantially responsible for the infestation, the landlord would appear to be amply protected by the "bad faith" clause.
The lack of hot water, particularly in the winter, is a fundamental
deprivation which most Americans would feel most keenly. It is
suggested that if these problems arise, the court should consider that
it is permitted, but not required, to find that the conditions justify
the defense. If the legislature had in fact intended to render these
conditions no defense at all, it could have easily done so. It would be
most offensive for any court to hold that asserting the defense because
the landlord refused to repair a defective water heater was "bad faith"
which required imposition of counsel fees.
The foregoing infelicities in drafting, a result of the compromise
origins of the law and the normal progression of the legislative process,
do not present insurmountable problems, but seem typical of difficulties
which are encountered in new legislation. Although it falls far short
of a well coordinated statutory plan which would provide different
remedies suitable for different problems, the statute appears to provide a start toward giving tenants an economic weapon to force
landlords to repair. It would do so except for one fundamental, deliberate omission - the statute fails to prevent retaliatory evictions.
88. The power to diminish unconscionably high rents seems to be an important
one. It is analogous to the power of the courts to rewrite sales contracts for unconscionability under § 2-302 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. See Leff, Unconscion-

ability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rzv. 485 (1967).
Functionally, sales concepts might very well carry over to some lease problems. To the extent that the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL Coog is a broad declaration of
policy by the legislature, its provisions should be considered, a suggestion which might
offend those who favor conceptualistic distinctions even if there is no sound ethical
basis for doing so.
The problems of lease construction are often ones of "unconscionability." See
Note, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion Contract, 111 U. PA.

L. Riv. 1197 (1963).

89. See note 77 supra.
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RETALIATORY EVICTIONS A DELIBERATE LEGISLATIVE
OMISSION AND A HALF-WAY REFORM

Before approving the Rent Escrow Act, the legislature deleted a
provision which would have prevented retaliatory eviction for withholding rent. 9° Because of this omission, a landlord against whom a
successful defense of rent withholding was asserted can nevertheless
evict the "prevailing" tenant in sixty days with a simple notice to
quit. During the first year of its enactment, the rent escrow defense
was only employed in nine cases. In four of those instances the landlord issued a sixty day eviction noticeY1 Thus the entire statutory
plan was effectively frustrated.
Responding to tenants' complaints, the legislature enacted the
anti-retaliatory eviction statute of 1969.92 In its original form this
bill was intended to be a broad prohibition against all retaliatory eviction which would have protected tenants complaining to building inspectors and other agencies as well as those withholding rent.93 It
would have protected against retaliatory eviction,94 rent increases, or
cuts in services for a year after such tenant action.
An entire section was devoted to protection of landlords' interests.95 This provided that such retaliatory action could be taken if
the tenant, his family, or "invitee" 96 caused the complained of condition beyond ordinary wear and tear. It also permitted the landlord
to recover possession of the property for his own personal use as a
dwelling or to increase the rent because of increased taxes or mainte90. The deleted provision, subsection (G) of Senate Bill 130, is set out in full
at note 71 supra.

91. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
92. Ch.223, [1969] Md. Laws 680.
93. Proposed subsection 1(b) (1). Ch. 223, § 1(b) (1) [1969] Md. Laws 681.
The statute was drafted by the Department of Housing and Community Development,
a Baltimore City agency, in response to the direction of Mayor D'Alesandro, a few
days after the decision in Sommers v. Goode, No. 8-078979 (Baltimore City Ct., Feb.
4, 1969) in The Daily Record (Baltimore), Feb. 8, 1969, at 5, col. 1. Interview with
Robert C. Embry, Director, Housing and Community Development, in Baltimore,
Sept. 22, 1969. See note 100 infra. Sommers permitted retaliatory eviction where
the tenant had complained to the housing authorities. Thus, apparently it was the
original mandate to produce a statute which would not only protect tenants who employed rent withholding, but also those who did not have grounds for doing so and
instead complained to the building inspectors.
94. Proposed subsection 1(b) (2). Ch. 223, § 1 (b) (2) [1969] Md. Laws 681.
95. Ch. 223, § 1(c) [1969] Md. Laws 682.
96. Ch. 223, § 1(c) (1) [1969] Md. Laws 682. Was a social guest meant to be
encompassed by the term invitee? Under conventional tort law, an invitee is a business guest, whereas a social guest is merely a licensee. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 60, at
386 (3d ed. 1964). Why there should be derivative "liability" in the form of loss of
protection from retaliatory eviction from the actions of business guests but not social
guests is not clear. It could have been the drafters' intention to have such a result
for those who informally sublease by "sharing" housing with the lessee, but this is
far from plain. It appears rather that the language came from a form book of sorts.
The MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 4, permits
retaliatory eviction if the condition complained of was caused "[b]y the tenant or another person in his household or on the premises with his consent .... § 2-407(2) (e).
The last phrase is overbroad, since the landlord himself could be on the premises with
the consent of the tenant, as well as a number of others whose actions ought not
necessarily be charged to the tenant, despite his consent to their presence.
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nance expenses other than those incurred in repairing code defects.9" It
similarly permitted raising the rent if the landlord made substantial improvements on the leased premises." In addition, the landlord was permitted to recover possession or raise rent for any other "good cause." 99
Thus, as originally drafted, it provided protection to landlord
and tenant alike. However, in enacting this bill the legislature emasculated the tenant's protection but left the protection afforded to the
landlord intact.1"' Retaliatory eviction or rent increase is prohibited
only where a tenant has complained of defects found by the court to
be conditions which justify the imposition of rent withholding.'
Retaliatory action is prohibited for six months." 2 Since rent with97. Ch. 223, § 1(c) (4) [1969] Md. Laws 682.
98. Id. The language is entirely too general, permitting a raise in rent disproportionate to the expenditures made. The drafters of the MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 4, sought to prevent this by permitting an increase in rent for substantial capital improvement if "the increase in rent does not
exceed the amount which may be claimed for Federal Income Tax purposes as a
straight-line depreciation of the improvement, prorated among the dwelling units
benefited by the improvement. . . ." § 2-407(4) (c). While a similar result might
be reached through statutory construction, the simple language of the Code provides a
readily ascertainable standard which seems fair.
99. Ch. 223, § 1(c) (5) [1969] Md. Laws 683.
100. During the legislative hearings in Annapolis, on March 4, 1969, the Baltimore
mayor's representative, Maurice J. Soypher, read a letter from the mayor which
supported the legislation "in principle," and which suggested that the proposed twelvemonth period of protection be reduced to six months. The mayor's support of the
legislation was later reduced further, backing protection only to those who could
successfully withhold rent. Interview with Robert C. Embry, Jr., Director, Department of Housing and Community Development, in Baltimore, Sept. 22, 1969. See
note 93 supra.
101. Ch. 223, § 1(b) (1) [19691 Md. Laws 681.
102. Ch. 223, § 1(b) (2) [1969] Md. Laws 682. This is the same period of time
chosen by the drafters of the MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra
note 4, § 2-407(1). It is interesting to speculate whether this is a sufficient time. The
purpose is to create enough of a penumbra of protection around a tenant's status so
that he will not fear asking for repairs. It may be that six months is just long
enough to create this feeling of protection in relatively self-assertive tenants, whereas
the elderly and the ill might still be hesitant to attempt to vindicate their rights.
While this is merely speculative, it is not likely that there is any reliable data on the
question, and the time chosen by the legislature is likely based on political expediency
rather than on a close consideration of the underlying problems of individual behavior
balanced against the competing values of traditional property rights. Because of this
the choice of the court in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969), to prohibit retaliatory eviction for no particular period
of time, so long as the eviction is shown to be retaliatory, may actually be preferable
to the six-month presumption of the Maryland statute and the MODEL RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 4.
An interesting note to the construction of this statute is the length of protection it affords. The statute prohibits bringing an action for six months. Subsection
1 (b) (2) provides, "If notice of eviction, increase in rent, or decrease in services was
given within six months from the withholding of the rent as provided in subsection
(B) (1) hereof, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the landlord acted in
retaliation." Since the action to be brought would be an eviction on sixty days' notice,
it would seem that a total of about eight months' protection is given between the
tenant's action and actual eviction.
Landlords who are anxious to evict their tenants as soon as possible might
attempt to avoid this extra two months by employing a prohibitively high retaliatory
rent increase and then using summary eviction for failure to pay rent. See text at
note 11 supra.
However, a landlord cannot unilaterally alter the terms of the lease agreement,
which is a contract. A rent increase is only binding by mutual agreement. De Young
v. Buchanan, 10 G. & J. 149 (Md. 1838). It would seem therefore, that summary
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holding is permitted only for major defects, 10 3 the tenants who must
rely on the remedy of ordinary code enforcement to remedy minor
defects are given no protection by this statute.
Beyond these overt limitations, there is even some question as to
whether the new law gives protection to the tenant who qualifies for

rent withholding. The statute protects the tenant if eviction or other
action is "inretaliation for the tenant withholding rent which the
court determines a proper exercise of rights under [the Rent Escrow
Law]."14

There is an important ambiguity here. Does this mean

that a tenant must be successful in withholding rent, or does it mean
that he would be entitled to successfully withhold rent? If it means
that the tenant must prevail in defending an eviction action for failure
to pay rent because defects justify rent withholding, then the bill is
almost a nullity.
The Rent Withholding Act requires a tenant to demand repairs
by certified mail in order to withold rent.' 05 Upon receipt of such a
notice, a landlord who wanted to retaliate would merely issue a sixty
day notice to quit.0 6 While this could mean giving up two months'
rent, landlords may find this loss economically sound in comparison
with having to repair and finding rent frozen. On a broader level, it
may pay the landlord to create a climate of apprehension of retaliatory eviction.
The ambiguity which may permit this evasion, whether the tenant
must actually withold rent or merely be entitled to withhold rent, is in
part a product of the defensive nature of the rent withholding statute.
In order to give the statute any real effect, it must be construed to
mean that retaliatory eviction is prohibited where the tenant has good
grounds for withholding rent. A previous judicial determination of
proper rent withholding should be unnecessary. Otherwise the statute
would permit the landlord to circumvent the protection given to tenants by not evicting for failure to pay rent, but rather by simply
giving notice to quit before rent is withheld.
This construction does not solve tenants' problems. The antiretaliatory eviction statute accentuates the evils of the defensive nature
of the Rent Escrow Act. Now, when the tenant guesses at his peril
whether the condition he complains of will be held to justify rent
eviction for failure to pay rent would not lie where a landlord unilaterally raised
rent so long as the tenant continued to tender the old, agreed upon rent. The landlord
could evict, but not summarily for failure to pay rent.
103. See text at note 77 supra.
104. Ch. 223, § 1(b) (1) [1969] Md. Laws 682.
105. A governmental agency may also notify the landlord by violation or condemnation notice. Ch. 459, § 1(b) (1) [1968] Md. Laws 833.
106. Issuing a sixty day notice to quit does not prevent a landlord during this
period from successfully evicting a tenant for failure to pay rent if the rent withholding defense of the tenant fails. Because retaliation is clearly prohibited should the
tenant be successful in withholding rent, landlords are not likely to evict for failure
to pay rent if the tenant's chances for withholding appear favorable. If it appears
that the tenant's chances are not favorable, the landlord may elect to pursue both types
of eviction if he wants to insure retaliation, since the right to redemption permits the
tenant to remain after successful summary ejection if the rent is paid in time. Waiting
until after a tenant has redeemed to issue a sixty day notice would simply delay the
tenant's removal.
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withholding, the danger he runs is clearly retaliatory eviction. This
will be the case unless the courts prohibit retaliation where rent was
1 7
withheld in "good faith," a construction which may be desirable, "
but which requires stretching the statutory language. So, on the one
hand, the new statute fails to encourage tenants to vindicate their
rights. On the other hand, it may encourage rent withholding to the
exclusion of code complaints. Assuming that a tenant living in defective premises views rent withholding and complaints to authorities
as alternatives, he will elect to use the stronger remedy - rent withholding - in order to increase his protection against retaliatory
eviction. It may be that the scope of the anti-retaliatory eviction
statute was limited out of antipathy for tenants' remedies. If so, this
result would be proper irony.
The anti-retaliatory eviction statute does little. It does nothing
for a tenant whose dwelling has defects which do not justify rent
withholding, and it possibly does next to nothing for a tenant who
is entitled to withhold rent. Since it is unlikely that the legislature
will broaden the ambit of this law, the question is put quite squarely:
can the courts fill the gap?
V.
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JUDICIAL RESPONSE

In Edwards v. Habib,' the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia was faced with an instance of retaliatory eviction for the
tenant's complaint of code violations to the housing authority. After
the tenant, Mrs. Yvonne Edwards, complained, the Department of
Licenses and Inspections discovered more than forty violations which
it ordered the landlord, Nathan Habib, to repair. Thereupon the
landlord gave Mrs. Edwards notice to vacate. A default judgment for
the plaintiff-landlord was set aside by the Court of General Sessions
after the defendant made a prompt motion to reopen. The court considered, in setting aside the default, that, if retaliation were proved,
the eviction would not lie. The court reasoned that the right to report
violations of law is constitutionally protected against private interference. However, when the action came to trial before a different
judge of the Court of General Sessions, retaliation was held irrelevant,
and the plaintiff-landlord was granted a directed verdict. 10 9 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the constitutional and policy arguments of the tenant. "10 The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed, two to one, with a thorough
opinion by Judge J. Skelly Wright."'
The court initially considered the constitutional assertions of
the tenant: first, that the private action of the landlord in retaliating
107. The contrary choice was made by the drafters of the MOD9L R5IMZNTIAL
LANDLORD-TxNANT Conz, supra note 4, § 2-407(1). See note 50 supra.
108. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
109. Id. at 689.
110. Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388 (D.C. 1967).
111. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969).
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against the tenant for petitioning the government for redress and
reporting violations of the law became impermissible governmental
action when enforced by the courts and second, even if this is not
unconstitutional governmental action, that the right to report violations of the law has direct protection not only against governmental
but also private interference.1 1 2 However, the court felt it did not
need to decide the constitutional issues; instead, it held that Congress,
in enacting housing codes and regulations for the protection of tenants,
had evinced a strong policy which would be contravened by retaliatory
eviction." 3 In concurring, Judge McGowan felt that the policy question was so strong that the constitutional arguments did not even need
discussion.1 4 Judge Danaher dissented, reasoning that if retaliatory
eviction is to be prohibited it must be by legislative action and not
by judicial decree." 5
Weinberg v. Scheper" 6 and Sommers v. Goode,"' decided in the
Baltimore courts subsequent to Habib, are two cases evoking published
opinions where the defense of retaliatory eviction has been raised. In
each case the tenant had complained to the housing authority and
was subsequently evicted on sixty day's notice. In each case the court
assumed that the eviction was in retaliation to the complaint, and in
each case the court held that legislation was necessary to make retaliatory eviction a defense. The subsequent anti-retaliatory eviction statute
has failed to do this since these were not rent withholding cases.
In Weinberg, Judge Rogers of the Baltimore People's Court
relied on three principal reasons for concluding that legislation was
necessary: first, the concept of separation of powers required that
fundamental changes in the law be made by the legislature; second,
that setting a time limitation on the defense of retaliatory eviction
was a legislative function; and third, that the defendant could have
protected himself with a written lease. The first two are grounds
relied on in Sommers and will be discussed shortly. The third ground,
that the tenant could have protected himself with a written lease,
deserves separate comment. One would have thought that by now
the notion that the market place is peopled by sophisticated parties
of equal bargaining power, able to look out for themselves, had been
thoroughly discredited. Oral and written leases of both rich and poor
tenants are products of a "take it or leave it" situation where tenants
have no effective power to control the terms of the bargain.
In Sommers v. Goode," 8 a trial de novo on appeal from the
Baltimore People's Court, Judge Sodaro of the Baltimore City Court
also concluded that substantial changes in law had to come from the
legislature and that prohibiting retaliatory evictions necessitated set112. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). See text
accompanying note 143 infra.
113. 397 F.2d at 699.
114. Id. at 703.
115. Id.
116. No. 24453-68 (People's Ct., Baltimore, Nov. 30, 1968) in The Daily Record
(Baltimore), Dec. 5, 1968, at 2, col. 4.
117. No. 8-078979 (Baltimore City Ct., Feb. 4, 1969) in The Daily Record (Baltimore), Feb. 8, 1969, at 5, col. 1.
118. Id.
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ting a time limit for asserting the defense, an action which should
not come from the judiciary. The opinion went further than that in
Weinberg and considered the constitutional arguments raised in Habib
and the effect of the Rent Escrow Act on retaliatory evictions. The
court said that, had the tenant withheld rent instead of simply complaining to the housing authorities, he would have been entitled to
the protection afforded by the Rent Escrow Act." 9 This statement
seems strange since the court recognized 1) that the defects complained of were not serious enough to justify rent withholding and 2)
that the act provided no protection against retaliatory eviction.
The court asserted, "The tenant's First Amendment rights to
report housing code violations and to petition for redress of grievances
was protected by this specific legislation [the Rent Escrow Act]. ... ""'
This is interesting since the act does not afford any protection to complainants but only prevents summary eviction for failure to pay rent.
The Rent Escrow Act gives only limited protection to a remedy rent withholding. While it may be argued that asserting such a
remedy is "speech," the act does not protect this speech from retaliation by notice to quit and does not undertake to protect the tenant's
right to make complaints to building inspectors at all, except as an
alternative means of initiating rent withholding. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that failure to take advantage of this "protection"

was a waiver of the constitutional rights the tenant asserted. "This
Court does not view the situation of the tenant as one where constitutional rights have been denied but rather as a case where he, for
reasons of his own, failed to follow the precepts of existing laws."''
Moreover, the court felt that prohibiting landlords from retaliating for reporting code violations would somehow conflict with the
purposes of the Rent Escrow Act. "If this Court were to agree with
the tenant's contention, a minor code violation when reported to the
Bureau could form the basis of a defense of retaliatory eviction but
could not be used as a defense under the Rent Escrow Act. Certainly

such a result would be irrational.' 2 2 It is difficult to see any irrationality. The defense would come from the constitution or from
fundamental state policy implicit in the housing code. Second, simply

because the greater remedy, rent escrow, is reserved by statute for
greater defects does not mean that retaliatory evictions should be
permitted when tenants must use the lesser remedy. Retaliatory evic-

tions should be prohibited whether or not rent escrow is permitted. 23

The contention that reform must come from the legislature, the
central point in both Weinberg and Sommers, needs more complete

consideration. The problem may be seen as two separate issues: first,
whether the legislative action in the field has closed the door to judicial
119. Id. at col. 4.

120. Id. at col. 5.
121. Id. at col. 4.
122. Id.
123. Indeed, it can be argued that prohibiting retaliatory eviction of those who
can withold rent and not those who can only make code complaints is an irrational
discrimination repugnant to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See text accompanying note 142 infra.
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retaliatory eviction is
reform and second, if not, whether prohibiting 24
simply too big a change for the courts to make.
Had the legislature not dealt with retaliatory eviction at all, it
would be easy to make the argument relied on by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Habib that the existence of
building codes implies a strong policy against circumvention by retaliatory eviction. But the Maryland legislature refused to pass the antiretaliatory eviction section of the Rent Withholding bill and, a year
later, passed a law which fails to protect tenants who may not withhold rent, but who simply complain to the building inspectors. Does
it follow that, from July 1968 to July 1969 Maryland had a policy
which favored all retaliatory eviction and from July 1969 on, has a
policy favoring retaliatory eviction of only those who complain to
building inspectors? Surely it makes some sense to assert that there
is no policy in favor of blatant circumvention of protective legislation - the building codes."2 5 The failure to enact legislation is explicable for so many disparate reasons that it is dangerous to use it
as a major premise in an attempt to reach a reasoned conclusion.
Maryland's legislative action is probably a false lead to solving the
problem, and the question ought to be put more directly: can the courts
adequately resolve -the conflicting social interests which retaliatory
eviction presents? This calls for an examination of those interests.
One argument in favor of legislative action is that courts are not
in a position to provide a cut-off time to the defense of retaliatory
eviction. The legislature adopted a six-month period in the recent antiretaliatory eviction statute,1 26 a measure which seems corroborative
of the assertion that legislative action is required. Most courts would
feel extremely uncomfortable decreeing such a time limit. Whether
or not legislatures are in fact more competent than courts to choose
arbitrary limits, they are more accustomed to doing so. It is not surprising that the intermediate court in Habib, Judge Danaher's dissent
in that case on appeal,1 27 and the opinions in Weinberg and Sommers
assert that legislative judgment is required.
The argument makes some sense, but it falls short of being compelling. Its major fallacy is the assumption that the defense of retaliatory eviction must have a time limitation. If there is a statutory
124. Such a decision would hardly be the sort of judicial activism, for example, as
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Brown v. Board of Educ.,

347 U.S. 483 (1954), or Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

Nor would it reach

the judicial innovation of the abolition of charitable immunity by the Supreme Court
of Illinois in Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950), and Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
125. The legislative findings and purpose of the Anti-Retaliatory Eviction Act
declare retaliatory eviction to be against "public policy." Ch. 223, § 1 (a) (5) [1968]
Md. Laws 682.
126. The drafters of the MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra
note 4, impliedly take the position that legislation is required with the observation
that "In the absence of any statute, only one court has denied the landlord an absolute
right to retaliate." MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, supra note 4, at 70,
citing, Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968). However, in Portnoy v.
Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1968), the Binghamton City Court followed
Habib. In addition to the holding that retaliatory eviction may be proven by the
tenant, the case may be cited for the more general proposition that there is a defense
to Portnoy's Complaint.
127. 397 F.2d at 703.
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presumption of retaliation which would arise after rent withholding
or complaints to housing authorities, this would be so, for otherwise
the presumption would continue indefinitely. But if there is no statutory presumption that eviction is retaliatory, there is no need to end it.
Thus the majority in Habib permitted a showing by the tenant that
the eviction was retaliatory 28 but did not need to create a cut-off
time. Absent a statutory presumption of retaliation, the only necessity for a cut-off time is the unfounded supposition that otherwise a
perpetual tenancy would result, producing an unconstitutional encroachment on the landlord's property rights. It is difficult to imagine
a court holding that proof of a complaint to the housing authorities
in years past would satisfy the burden of proof that a tenant must
meet to raise the defense of retaliatory eviction. 1 29 Using this "danger"
as an excuse for not prohibiting retaliatory evictions is rank sophistry.
Even though perpetual tenancies would not result, it is plain that
prohibiting retaliatory eviction limits the landlord's freedom to deal
with his property as he chooses. The same may be said of zoning
regulations, building codes, health and safety laws, the sixty day wait
to evict a tenant who is not in default, and many other rules. Completely unfettered property has probably always been a myth. So long
as the invasion of the landlord's property rights is moderate, only
carried to the extent reasonably necessary to give effect to the competing legitimate interests of tenants, there should be no doubt of its
constitutionality. In this respect, a judge-made prohibition against
retaliatory eviction is no more an invasion of the landlord's interests
than is a statute.
This is not to say that there is no utility in setting a definite
time period for the defense of retaliatory eviction. Having a time
certain for rights and liabilities is desirable in many areas - this is
one. A definite period of protection where the burden of proof is
virtually dispensed with has a stabilizing effect conducive to tenants
making justified complaints. 8 ' For the landlord, it is desirable to
know exactly when a tenant may be evicted without a successful defense so that needless litigation may be avoided. But a court-declared
prohibition against retaliatory eviction would not be unworkable. As
a practical matter, showing a code complaint and prompt eviction
would meet the tenant's burden for a few months after the complaint.
After three, four, or five months, this effect would dwindle, and the
tenant would have to show more to keep his tenancy. Indeed, with
the burden of proof on the tenant, the landlord would probably be in
a slightly better position with a judge-made rule than if the legislature
simply extended the ambit of the present statute.
Seeing that a definite time limitation is not indispensable, but
merely a desirable aspect of legislative action, permits the question
128. Id. at 702. See Note, Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Eviction, 3

Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LrB. L. Rxv. 193, 206-08 (1967).

HARV.

129. Similarly, the vision of an unscrupulous tenant cleverly making periodic complaints to insure his tenancy is nonsense. If they are legitimate complaints, he should
be protected. If not, he may be evicted. Even if such action is something to guard
against, a court need not reject many worthy claims to uncover it.
130. See note 102 supra.
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whether it would be better for a prohibition against retaliatory eviction to come from the courts or the legislature. It is an impossible
question to answer. Better for whom and why? Better for landlords
to have a diluted prohibition which would be the result of judicial
action, or better to have certainty from legislation which would
probably give tenants more protection and encourage complaints more
effectively? Better for the tenant to have the burden of proving retaliation which will become increasingly hard to meet as time wears on, or
better to have a presumption which completely disappears at a certain
time? One is tempted to join Judge Traynor in his rhetorical question:
"Can you weigh a bushel of horsefeathers against next Thursday?"''
The questions are not easily answered, and certainly are not
answered by vague shibboleths concerning the proper roles of courts
and legislatures.'
While legislative action may offer slight advantages, it does not exclude judicial action. Perhaps the most obvious
reason for the hesitancy of the courts to act is that rent escrow and
retaliatory eviction have been considered political questions by the
general public. This opinion has been created, in part, by the selffulfilling prophesy of the courts that the matter needed legislative
correction, and by the supreme bench's unusual step of mandamus to
curtail an adventurous people's court which ordered a common-law
rent escrow. 133 If the courts will not act, then the legislature must.
If the legislature must, how can it be a matter for the courts?
One must recall that the present anti-retaliatory eviction statute was
drafted in response 3to
the decision of the Baltimore City Court in
4
Sommers v. Goode.1
131. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTXMP. PROB. 754 (1963).
According to Currie, Traynor is indebted to Professor Prosser for this quotation;
Prosser to an unknown English judge.
132. Most attempts to define the proper scope of judicial lawmaking powers have
been understandably vague.
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A
common-law judge could not say I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of
historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court.
Holmes, J., dissenting in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
If judges may fill gaps, that is, legislate "interstitially," how big may those
gaps be ?
Chief Justice Traynor of California, a respected "judicial legislator," discusses some of his guidelines in Traynor, The Courts: Interweavers in the Reformation of Law, 32 SASKATCHEWAN L. Rzv. 203 (1967). While he recognizes the need

to proceed carefully, he has no patience with those who maintain courts should make
no changes:
The tenet of lag, strengthening the already great restraints on the judge, is
deservedly respected. It bears noting, however, that it is recurringly invoked
by astute litigants who receive aid and comfort from law that is safely behind
the times with the peccadillos of yesteryear and has not caught up with their
own. At the slightest sign that judge-made law may move forward, these bogus
defenders of stare decisis conjure up mythical dangers to alarm the citizenry.
They do sly injury to the law when the public takes them seriously, and timid
judges retreat from painstaking analysis within their already great constraints
to safe and unsound repetitions of magic words from the legal lore of the year
before much too long ago.
Id. at 205.
133. See Jacob Klotzman Co. v. Bacharach, No. 102386 (Super. Ct., Baltimore,
Dec. 15, 1966).

134. No. 8-078979 (Baltimore City Ct., Feb. 4, 1969) in The Daily Record (Baltimore), Feb. 8, 1969, at 5, col. 1. See note 93 supra.
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One usually does not think of criticizing lower courts for failing
to make innovative decisions. However, when they sit as appellate
courts, they should behave as appellate courts. They recognize this
unaccustomed role by publishing their opinions. The obligation of
appellate-like law-making is most evident in the case of the Baltimore
City Court when it hears appeals from the people's court as trials
de novo. 3 5 Then it is not simply an intermediate appellate court since
review by the court of appeals is discretionary by writ of certiorari.'" 6
VI.

JUDICIAL

RESPONSE -

CONSTITUTIONAL

COMPULSION

If the problem of whether the courts should prohibit retaliatory
eviction cannot be answered by considering matters of local policy,
perhaps it may be resolved by federal policy. For if retaliatory evictions are unconstitutional, then the question of whether judicial or
legislative action is more desirable becomes moot.
It would seem that the area which the Maryland legislature left
unprotected - where tenants are evicted for making complaints to
the housing authorities but have taken no other action - is where it
is easiest to argue that retaliatory eviction is unconstitutional. Complaint to the housing authorities is speech of a very important kind." 7
If any speech is deserving of protection by the courts, certainly complaints to officials charged with protecting a large segment of the
public interest should be protected. As in Shelly v. Kraemer,3 8 where
the judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants was held to be "state
action" in contravention of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the judicial approval of an eviction retaliatory to
such a complaint could be said to be state action which has a significant freezing effect on the exercise of protected speech and the right
to petition the government for redress.
While the court in Sommers dismissed the Shelly v. Kraemer
argument with the distinction that racial discrimination was not
claimed in Sommers, the state action theory has not been limited to
racial discrimination and the equal protection clause. In the familiar
case of New York Times v. Sullivan, ' 9 the Supreme Court applied
it through the due process clause to a state court libel judgment
which had a freezing effect on freedom of speech. The state action
is the same - enforcing a "private" cause of action. 4 ' The Supreme
135. MD. ANN. CoDn art. 5, § 30 (1957).
136. MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 21 (1957).
137. The first amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances has traditionally been given broad protection. E.g., United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41 (1953) ; Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
138. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
139. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
140. The constitutional discussion in Habib was relied upon in "holding" that
retaliatory eviction was unconstitutional in Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp.
501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Instead of resting on due process grounds, the decision apparently relies on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Despite this
holding, the court refused to enjoin a state court eviction proceeding under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964) (Civil Rights Act) because it was not sufficiently clear to the court
that the New York state courts would refuse to recognize the defense of retaliatory
eviction. 299 F. Supp. at 507.

224

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIX

Court's use of the guarantee of free speech as the underpinning of
4
several recent important decisions lends weight to this argument.'1
Another fourteenth amendment argument is that the present antiretaliatory eviction statute denies some people the equal protection
of the laws. It distinguishes between those who withhold rent and
those who merely report violations to the housing authorities. The
justification for this is that rent withholding is reserved for greater
defects. However, this is not a sound reason for failing to prohibit
retaliatory eviction. The greater defect is justification for granting
the greater remedy. It is not justification for failing to give protection to the use of both remedies. However, the Supreme Court has
stretched so far to justify seemingly irrational state classifications
42
that this argument, while perhaps cogent, might not be adopted.
The next basic argument is that one has a constitutional right to
report violations of the law - a right which is protected against
private as well as governmental interference. This grows out of In re
Quarles & Butler.143 The argument was distinguished by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Habib v. Edwards1 44 on the
ground, apparently, that In re Quarles & Butler involved the Civil
Rights Act. This distinction was convincingly rejected by Judge J.
Skelly Wright in Edwards v. Habib:
[T]he enforcement section of the Civil Rights Act provided
remedies for the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. It did not create new rights....
It is not necessarily relevant, therefore, that because of the peculiar
requirements of the civil rights statutes they may not provide
her [Mrs. Edwards] with additional affirmative
civil or criminal
remedies for violations of the same right. 45
It would seem, therefore, that the argument that retaliatory eviction
is unconstitutional
does not need to rest upon the shifting sands of
146
"state action.'

141. United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217
(1967) ; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377
U.S. 1 (1964) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
142. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935), citing, Rast v.
Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916) and Tax Comm'r v. Jackson,
283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931). Of course race was held to be an unacceptable ground for
school segregation in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The recent case
of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), in which one year residence requirements for welfare benefits were held to be unconstitutional, may mark a willingness
to subject state classifications to even more stringent standards. "But in moving
from State to State, or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest,
is unconstitutional." Id. at 634.
143. 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
144. Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388, 391 (D.C. 1967).
145. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016 (1969).
146. Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in
"Private" Housing, 52 CALIrF. L. Rv. 1 (1964); Horowitz, The Misleading Search
for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. RZv. 208 (1957).
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But while cogent constitutional arguments can be made that retaliatory evictions should be prohibited, it is unfortunate that they
need to be made. It is rather a pity that courts need to resort to the
ever growing umbrella of constitutional compulsion in order to make
desirable policy changes. To be sure, it puts the responsibility of
decision making on federal shoulders, taking the burden of controversial cases from local courts. Even when a decision is made in a
state court, making it on constitutional grounds tends to insulate the
judge from possible criticism of "making law." This merely reaps a
short-run advantage, however, since it tends to centralize policy decisions. The holding of Habib, that it is implicit in the policy of the
jurisdiction which has a housing code to prevent circumvention, makes
good sense. Without a holding that retaliatory eviction is prohibited,
our meager statutory plan is frustrated. Certainly the fundamental
job of the courts is to make the law work; surely it is within their
domestic competence to do so.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Comparing the desirability of various tenants' remedies and the
ways in which they might be reached calls for the type of policy
analysis which, if it cannot present clear choices, can at least identify
competing interests. Evaluating the real usefulness of any remedy or
combination of remedies is an absorbing but speculative process. We
really do not know how good any of these propositions are. We cannot say whether they will make much difference in the abominable
conditions in which millions of poor people live. Few commentators
seriously contend that tenant remedies are themselves sufficient to
make a substantial change.
The question raises the basic issue whether law reform is a
realistic way to bring about change, one of the central tenets of faith
behind the Legal Services Program. 4 7 The question starts a chickenegg sort of argument - whether law makes or reflects social power.
Certainly it does both, but the relative percentages of what it does are
most difficult to assess. Law reform is doing something for the poor,
but it is important to observe that the wave of legal services truly
got started in 1965 when the poor were beginning to become a more
potent political and social force.
During the same time the political and economic power of the
landlords has been declining somewhat. The low income housing
market is not economically healthy. 4 ' While some landlords manage
to make unconscionably high profits "milking" their properties,' 4 9
others cannot survive, and thousands of abandoned dwellings haunt
our inner cities. Insurance and financing become more scarce and
more expensive, sometimes unobtainable. 150 Property tax rates climb
147. P.

WALD, LAW AND POVERTY:

1965.

148. G. STERNLIEB, TH4 TENEMENT LANDLORD 76-97 (1966).
149. Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing,
53 CALIP. L. Rxv. 304, 320 n.83 (1965) ; ESQUIRE, July 1966, at 92. See generally W.
KLEIN, LET IN THE SUN (1964).
150.

PRSIMNT's

NATIONAL ADvISORY
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(1968).
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and the fleeing middle class take their incomes to bedroom communities which are not responsive to the economic needs of the cities. The
cities themselves lack economic health. To think that rent escrow,
receivership, repair and deduct, and all the other tenant remedies, however cleverly conceived, will reverse "urban blight" is terribly naive. 5 '
The continued presence of the "private sector" in low income
housing is in substantial jeopardy. As the poor continue to grow in
political, social, and even economic power, private landlords will be
supplanted, in large measure, if they fail to provide adequate housing.
The additional involvement of the federal government in public housing in the past few years has been striking. Accurately perceiving
these threatening circumstances, landlords fear that tenants' remedies
will accelerate their replacement.' 52
On the contrary, it would seem that tenants' remedies represent
a fundamentally conservative force which will tend to preserve the
position of private housing in the low cost market. This would seem
to hold both advantages and disadvantages for poor tenants. Paternalistic bureaucracies are not always benign. Government may engage
in retaliatory evictions and other repressive actions for reasons which
would not even occur to private landlords. 55 Moreover, while the
public undoubtedly has the power to solve the problem of low cost
housing, there is no indication that it is willing to do so.
In order to make an intelligent attack on slum housing, imaginative public projects must be complemented with adequate tenants'
remedies. For that we need law reform. It is in this drama that the
law - the courts and the legislatures - cannot seem to learn its part.
The wave of rising expectations of the poor has been augmented by
the promise of change, and its absence is already keenly felt. The
curtain has been rung up on the act of landlord-tenant law reform.
Only after riots has the law stumbled on stage; now it stands mute
while its cues are being repeated. Whether it will stay to read its
lines remains to be seen.
151. "Until a much more effective administration of the housing regulations is
achieved, it would seem that the major hope for relief for the indigent tenant must
lie in the civil courts." Schoshinski, supra note 4, at 558.
152. The Daily Record (Baltimore), Feb. 18, 1967, at 5, col. 4, contained an
advertisement measuring nine inches by three and three-quarters inches, the top portion
of which read:
LANDLORDS
YOU CAN BE PUT OUT OF BUSINESS
By House Bill No. 410
If it is passed
House Bill No. 410 was a proposed rent escrow bill which probably would have
resulted in stricter code compliance. The advertisement was paid for by a group
known as the Property Owners Association.
153. Eviction was apparently in retaliation for being elected an officer of a tenant's
organization in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969). In Sanders v.
Cruise, 10 Misc. 2d 533, 173 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958), the government attempted
to evict a tenant because her adult son was a convicted drug addict even though he
did not live with her and apparently presented no problem when he visited her. See
Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A Survey of the Developing Law, 1969
DUKx L.J. 399; Note, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesirables" From Public Housing Projects, 77 YALn L.J. 988 (1968).

